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Although philosophers may first find it odd to speak of norms in the context of 
perception, the argument for normativity finds support in the writings of some of 
the spearheads of the phenomenological tradition, amongst them Edmund Husserl 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As Maren Wehrle argues however, a 
phenomenological analysis of perception’s normative claim requires that we redefine 
our traditional conception of norms as authoritative standards or prescriptive 
moral guidelines. To this end, as she points out, the origin of the concept of norm 
in architecture can be illuminating because it refers to a measure or guideline which 
emerges out of “practical motivations”1 and serves to “facilitate cooperative and 
intersubjective communication.”2 In her view, prior to any theoretical or moral 
engagement with the world, certain sets of norms already play a role at an 
embodied, pre-reflexive level and account for our ability to orientate ourselves in the 
intersubjective lifeworld. My interest in the concept of norms stems from such a 
comprehension, and attempts to unfold and clarify some of its implications for 
perception in general. My goal in this paper is thus to address one of the key 
interpretations of perceptual norms in Merleau-Pontian scholarship and to suggest 
______________ 
* L’auteure est étudiante à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université de 
Montréal). 
1 Maren Wehrle, “Normality and Normativity in Experience”, in Normativity 
in Perception, ed. Breyer, T. and Doyon, (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), pp. 128-140, here p. 1. 
2 Ibid.  
Corinne Lajoie 
 2 
a new reading of their role in the Phenomenology of Perception (1945), 
through the lense of interest and temporality. 
A growing number of works in recent scholarship address the 
topic of normativity in perception and its relevance for 
phenomenology3. Although philosophers may first find it odd to 
speak of norms in the context of perception, the argument for 
normativity finds support in the writings of some of the spearheads 
of the phenomenological tradition, amongst them Edmund Husserl 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The question of how normativity gets a 
foothold in perception finds different responses in the philosophical 
litterature, but phenomenologists have generally attempted to show 
how perceptual behaviors are beholden to norms below the treshold 
of reflective activity. As Maren Wehrle argues, a phenomenological 
analysis of perception’s normative claim however requires that we 
redefine our traditional conception of norms as authoritative 
standards or prescriptive moral guidelines. To this end, as she points 
out, the origin of the concept of norm in architecture can be 
illuminating because it refers to a measure or guideline which emerges 
out of “practical motivations”4 and serves to “facilitate cooperative 
and intersubjective communication.”5 In her view, prior to any 
theoretical or moral engagement with the world, certain sets of norms 
already play a role at an embodied, pre-reflexive level and account for 
our ability to orientate ourselves in the intersubjective lifeworld. My 
interest in the concept of norms stems from such a comprehension, 
______________ 
3 See for example Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and 
Heidegger (Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press, 2013) ; Sean Kelly, 
“Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty.” In The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-
Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman, (Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press, 
2006), pp.74-110; “The Normative Nature of Perceptual Experience.” In 
Perceiving the World, ed. Bence Nanay, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp.146-158 ; Erik Rietveld, “Situated Normativity : The Normative 
Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action.” Mind, vol. 117, 
no. 468 (October 2008) : pp. 973-1001 ; Maxime Doyon et Timo Meyer, 
Normativity in Perception, (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
4 Wehrle, “Normality and Normativity in Experience”, p. 1. 
5 Ibid.  
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and attempts to unfold and clarify some of its implications for 
embodied perception in general. 
My goal in this paper is to address one of the key interpretations 
of perceptual norms in contemporary merleau-pontian scholarship 
and to suggest a new reading of their role in the Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945), through the lense of interest and temporality. A first 
section of this paper will thus provide a close reading of Sean Kelly’s 
argument in “Seeing Things In Merleau-Ponty” (2005) and outline his 
understanding of normativity in perception. Section 2 introduces 
criticisms raised by Samantha Matherne, in addition to my own, and 
opens up onto Section 3, which proposes a two-fold reading of 
perceptual norms in both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s writings. This 
last section introduces the concept of (practical) interest and argues in 
favor of the temporal emergence of perceptual norms and their 
embeddedness in living temporality. 
1. Perceptual norms in Merleau-Ponty : the ‘view from 
everywhere’ hypothesis 
In a section from the Phenomenology of Perception titled ‘The Thing 
and the Natural World’, Merleau-Ponty writes : “For each object, just 
as for each painting in an art gallery, there is an optimal distance from 
which it asks to be seen -an orientation through which it presents 
more of itself- beneath or beyond which we merely have a confused 
perception due to excess or lack.”6 With these words, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that the subject’s perceptual field is experienced normatively 
rather than simply descriptively. On this view, the optimal range I 
establish between me and a painting in a museum is neither 
formulated as an explicitly laid-out rule, nor is it a distance I could 
measure objectively. Rather, we might say that the optimal distance 
Merleau-Ponty refers to is the stance that feels ‘just right’ or 
‘appropriate’ in a given situation. What’s more, the establishment of 
this distance serves more than the reception of sense-data on my 
retina : customary phenomenological examples suggest that when the 
embodied subject sees a painting in a museum or reaches for her 
glasses on the bedside table, she immediately knows how to optimally 
______________ 
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. D. Landes 
(London : Routledge, 2012), p. 315-316. 
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navigate her surroundings in order to accomplish the task at hand. As 
Maria Talero puts it, a subject can be said to be “behaviorally 
attuned”7 to her environment when she is adequately responsive to 
the optimal interplay of action and perception it requires. 
Hubert Dreyfus’s distinction between success conditions and 
conditions of improvement works along similar lines to account for 
normativity in perception. Through this distinction, Dreyfus suggests 
that our context-dependent sensitivity to conditions of improvement 
allows us to constantly discriminate between better or worse ways to 
see things “without the agent needing in any way to anticipate what 
would count as success.”8 Although it might first seem peculiar to 
suggest that agents are driven towards improvement through their 
bodies, Dreyfus’ view echoes a variety of colloquial sayings that 
express how our bodies ‘take us here and there’ in everyday action, 
without prior deliberation. As such, phenomenologists would argue 
that our encounters with objects and others are bent upon implicitly 
acquired perceptual norms which shape our perceptual field and play 
an important part in facilitating our general orientations in the world. 
This is not to say that deontic norms are not equally important in 
many areas of our lives, but phenomenologists generally hold that 
codified or logical norms presuppose an elementary ground of 
intentional activity that is rooted in our experience of our own bodies.  
A central outcrop of the Phenomenology of Perception lies precisely in 
Merleau-Ponty’s detailed articulation of this specific type of motor 
intentionality and the author explores the subject’s openness to the 
world, conceived as a norm-sensitive space of (practical) meaning. To 
this end, as Sean Kelly rightly observes in “Seeing Things in Merleau-
Ponty”, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is uniquely relevant 
to adress the question of normativity. In his paper, Kelly makes use 
of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual norms to answer a classic 
problem in philosophy of perception. Put briefly, while Kelly argues 
that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of object-perception provides clear 
answers to the problem of property constancy, he is adamant in 
______________ 
7 Maria Talero, “The Experiential Workspace and the Limits of Empirical 
Investigation”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16, no. 4 (Fall 2017), 
p. 453-472, here p. 456. 
8 Hubert Dreyfus, “The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis”, 
Philosophical Topics 27, no. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 3-24, here p. 6. 
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defending that it does not provide clear answers to the problems of 
perceptual presence and object constancy9. In an attempt to provide 
answers to these problems, Kelly draws what he takes to be implicit 
conclusions on Merleau-Ponty’s part and argues for a normative 
account of perceptual experience. The first strokes of Kelly’s 
argument are largely in accordance with Merleau-Ponty’s own view in 
the Phenomenology and suggest that the perceptual field is experienced 
normatively by the embodied subject when perceived affordances 
render perceptually salient the ways in which indeterminate aspects, 
elements and profiles (Abschattungen) of a perceived object could be 
better determined and enrich our present view. Kelly’s general 
argument thus relies on the following two claims : (i) perception 
always involves an awareness of indeterminate aspects and (ii) our 
perceptions are always experienced as deviations from an optimal 
perception which would include these aspects and provide us with the 
richest, fullest view. 
Kelly explains : “Merleau-Ponty’s view of perception depends on 
the idea that the background of our perception of objects and their 
properties [...] must recede from view and yet functions everywhere 
to guide what is focally articulate.”10 In short, that which recedes 
from view and is indeterminate plays a normative role in my 
perception of things. The indeterminate horizon of experience serves 
as an orientation device of sorts, against which perceptual figures 
emerge. This partial indetermination (or absence) at the heart of any 
perception points to a possibility of fulfillment which hinges on the 
differential structure of perceptual experience. On Kelly’s view, 
perceptual norms thus manifest themselves through the 
(kinesthetically) experienced gap left open by the alternance of 
determination and indetermination in experience. 
______________ 
9 As Samantha Matherne, “Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual 
Presence and Constancy.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 55, no. 4 (Fall 
2017) : p.693-727, argues, and although this question will not concern us, 
such a failure on Merleau-Ponty’s part would prove problematic for the 
coherence and consistency of his account of perception. My main concern in 
what follows, however, does not touch directly on this question. 
10 Sean Kelly, « Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty », in The Cambridge Companion 
to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman (Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University 
Press), p. 74-110, here p. 76. 
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Although the author himself does not acknowledge it, reading as 
he does Husserl’s position largely inaccurately throughout this paper, 
Kelly’s preliminary outline of the normative structure of perception 
maps onto Husserl’s own descriptions of the normative tension 
constitutive of object-perception. In what follows, however, it is 
Kelly’s explanation for the way in which this experienced gap is 
cashed out in experience that should interest us. At first sight, I am 
very favorable to Kelly’s insistence on the essential articulation 
between indetermination, embodiment and normativity in Merleau-
Ponty’s account. As both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have 
convincingly shown, embodied perception is situated and thus 
necessarily entails a limited perspective on the world. Moreover, as 
Kelly argues, some perspectives are more relevant than others, in 
proportion to their ability to disclose an object’s relevant features in a 
better or worse way. Following Merleau-Ponty, Kelly holds that these 
different perspectives do not stand indiscriminately in everyday 
perception, and thus seeing things is always implicitly knowing how I 
could see them better. However, the problem with Kelly’s view, as I 
take it, lies in his explanation of this normative dimension of 
perception. Although I agree with some of Kelly’s claims, I take issue 
with what I consider to be the core argument of his paper and with 
the manner in which he proceeds to draw conclusions from Merleau-
Ponty’s text. 
Let us go back, for now, to Kelly’s sketching out of a merleau-
pontian answer to the problem of property constancy. Put coarsely, 
the problem of property constancy concerns our ability to perceive a 
property as one and the same in spite of a variation in its system of 
appearances. In his explanation, Kelly first suggests we consider the 
specific role played by lighting in perception. As Kelly puts it, an 
object’s ‘real’ colour, such as the constant colour of the table on 
which I write, is experienced “in a direct bodily manner”11 as the 
norm from which my current perception is felt to deviate. However 
much the light I cast on this table varies, (e.g. when I open the blinds 
in the morning, or when I close my desk lamp at night), my various 
perceptions of its shade “necessarily [make] an implicit reference to 
[...] the colour as it would be better revealed if the lighting context 
______________ 
11 Ibid., p. 85. 
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were changed in the direction of the norm.”12 The ‘real colour’, in this 
case, is thus an indeterminately given optimal perception, which 
nonetheless serves to establish the perceptual norm against which my 
current view stands. It is part of my perception of the table on which 
I work, argues Kelly, that I implicitly know “in a direct bodily 
manner”13 how the light should vary, how my body should move or 
how “the context should change”14 to allow me to see its ‘real’ colour. 
This explanation, however, proves insufficient to account for the 
problems of perceptual presence and object constancy. The first asks 
how we can perceive aspects of objects that are not immediately 
present in our perceptual field (i.e. when I perceive my laptop as 
having a backside when I am typing), while the second is a variation 
on the problem of property constancy as it applies to our perception 
of the unity of the perceptual flow of an object’s various profiles (i.e. 
knowing that my laptop is one and the same object as I move it 
around before my eyes). As Kelly explains, while I could 
hypothetically cast the optimal light on my table and see its ‘real’ 
colour, “there is no single point of view on the object that I could 
have that would reveal it maximally.”15 (Kelly 2006 : 90) Put 
otherwise, while the norm that served to explain the phenomena of 
property constancy was intuitively experiencable in ideal viewing 
conditions, the same does not seem to hold for three-dimensional 
objects in perception. The fundamentally embodied nature of 
perception foils any attempt to escape my point of view, and I can 
only ever see one of the object’s profiles at once. Kelly formulates the 
resulting problem in terms of access : given that our perceptions are 
always limited and indeterminate, what optimal perspective could give 
me a maximal grip on three-dimensional objects ? If the background 
features of experience really do play a normative role in our current 
perception, how are we to understand, in this case, the norm from 
which our perception is felt to deviate ? 
______________ 
12 Ibid., p. 86. 
13 Sean Kelly, « Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty », in The Cambridge Companion 
to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman (Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University 
Press).  
14 Ibid., p. 87. 
15 Ibid., p. 90. 
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Kelly’s answer to these questions is supported by a beautiful, and 
yet intricate passage from the Phenomenology of Perception. In the 
introduction to Part One, Merleau-Ponty is reflecting on perception’s 
ability to “come about from somewhere, without thereby being 
locked within its perspective.”16 Put coarsely, and following his 
illustration, his reflection amounts to the following interrogation : 
how can we take our perception of the house as we are walking up 
the street towards it to be a perception of the ‘real’ house ? Is it not 
the case that every one of these situated perceptions as I am walking 
up the street cannot give me “the house itself”17, but rather only 
always one of its profiles at once ? After rejecting the claim that “the 
house itself is the house seen from nowhere”18, given its blatant 
disavowal of the situatedness of embodied perception, Merleau-Ponty 
entertains a second proposition. As quoted by Kelly, Merleau-Ponty 
writes : 
[To] see an object is to come to inhabit it and to thereby 
grasp all things according to the sides these other things 
turn toward this object. [...] Each object, then, is the mirror 
of all the others. When I see the lamp on my table, I 
attribute to it not merely the qualities that are visible from 
my location, but also those that the fireplace, the walls, and 
the table can “see”. The back of my lamp is merely the face 
that it “shows” to the fireplace. [...] Thus, our formula 
above must be modified : the house itself is not the house 
seen from nowhere, but rather the house seen from 
everywhere. The fully realized object is translucent, it is 
shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes, 
intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden.19 
Kelly’s explanation of object constancy and perceptual presence 
follows from just this passage and gives great weight to the idea of an 
optimal “view from everywhere”20. Although this was never made 
______________ 
16 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 69. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 71. 
20 Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty”, p. 92. 
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explicit by Merleau-Ponty himself, Kelly argues that this passage from 
the Phenomenology of Perception is the key to understanding the two 
problems previously left unsolved. Moreover, although the ‘house 
seen from everywhere’ is in no way “a view that I can have”21, its 
virtual possibility sets the norm against which my current perception 
of the house is measured. The view from everywhere is further 
defined by Kelly as that which “would give me a better grip on the 
object than any single point of view could”22, even though this grip is 
not a grip my body actually could have, but rather a view virtually 
constituted by the various objects that stand over and against the 
central object I am perceiving. Lastly, Kelly concludes that the real or 
constant thing in perception is the “maximally articulate norm against 
which every particular presentation is felt to deviate”23 and “the 
background against which my perspectival presentation makes 
sense”24. In view of these conclusions, I take it that Kelly’s account of 
perceptual normativity suggests a notion of norms as set by 
experientially inaccessible optimal viewpoints, which our current 
perceptions can asymptomatically strive towards, without however 
ever reaching them. 
2. Some problems with this view 
In her response to Sean Kelly’s text, Samantha Matherne raises 
two main lines of criticism. For the purpose of my argument, I will 
leave aside her convincing defense of the role of style in Merleau-
Ponty’s account of object constancy and perceptual presence, and 
concentrate on the second aspect of her critique. As Matherne argues, 
one of the main concerns with Kelly’s argument is exegetical. I largely 
agree with Matherne that the passage on which Kelly’s argument 
relies, and which I have quoted at lenght above, is simply not meant 
to express Merleau-Ponty’s view. In true Merleau-Ponty fashion, the 
author’s argument in this section emerges through a discursive 
encounter with the pitfalls of both empiricist and intellectualist 
positions. Although Merleau-Ponty does rhetorically entertain the 
______________ 
21 Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty”, p. 91. 
22 Ibid., p. 92. 
23 Ibid., p. 97. 
24 Ibid., p. 98. 
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thought that the house itself could be the house “shot through from 
all sides by an infinity of present gazes”25, this hypothesis is rejected 
in its turn by the end of the chapter and the passage on which Kelly’s 
argument turns is eventually debunked. 
Most surprising, however, is the inconsistency between Kelly’s 
aknowledgement of the constitutive role of an interplay between 
determination and indetermination in perception, and his reliance on 
a passage defending the possibility of a ‘fully realized’ and ‘translucent 
object’. Such a conception of the object, it appears, would amount to 
the objectivist’s ‘absolute positing’ of an object, which Merleau-Ponty 
equates with “the death of consciousness, since it congeals all of 
experience [...].”26 In positing its objects as things that exist in-
themselves, the objectivist loses “the origin of the object at the very 
core of our experience”27 and causes us to “ignore the contribution 
we make through our embodied perspective.”28 
Notwithstanding these factors, my main concern with Kelly’s 
argument is not primarily exegetical. After all, it could be that Kelly’s 
reading of this passage is accurate, in which case I would still argue 
that it provides us with an incoherent view on perceptual norms. The 
problem I thus take to be more important than defending Merleau-
Ponty’s text is that of providing a phenomenologically sound account 
of embodied norms, as they emerge in the course of experience. As I 
hope to show, although perception strives towards richness and 
clarity, it does not do so aimlessly. On the one hand, I am only 
required a minimal awareness of my perceptual surroundings to find 
my glasses on the kitchen counter, for example. On the other, it 
seems clear that “more differentiation and more information is not 
necessarily positive or helpful [...] as it can turn the visible into 
something invisible.”29 This point is made very clearly by Merleau-
Ponty himself, as he explicitly harmonizes his claims regarding our 
striving for a maximum of visibility with a basic gestaltist principle of 
______________ 
25 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 71. 
26 Ibid., p. 74. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Samantha Matherne, “Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual 
Presence and Constancy”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 55, no. 4, p. 693-
727, here p. 701. 
29 Doyon, M. (manuscript). 
A Merleau‐Pontian Account of Embodied Perceptual Norms 
  11 
differentiation. That is to say, although “we seek, just as when using a 
miscroscope, a better focus point”30 on the thing perceived, 
perception is always a matter of equilibrium. Merleau-Ponty writes : 
A living body seen from too close, and lacking any 
background against which it would stand out, is no longer 
a living body, but rather a material mass as strange as the 
lunar landscape, as can be observed by looking at a 
segment of skin with a magnifying glass ; and seen from 
too far away, the living body again loses its living value, 
and is no longer anything but a puppet or an automaton.31  
The optimal perception, then, is to be found in the appropriate 
balance between background and foreground, between determination 
and indetermination or visibility and invisibility, where the perceived 
is still caught up with its living value, somewhere between the lunar 
landscape and the puppet. 
In light of these preliminary shortcomings, another main concern 
I have with Kelly’s claim that “[the] view from everywhere [...] is the 
optimum perspective from which to view the object”32 is the 
conclusions it might lead us to draw in regards to the limitations of 
embodied experience. Both for Husserl and for Merleau-Ponty, the 
situated character of perceptual experience does not hinder 
perception’s claim to see things, rather than ‘parts of things’ or mere 
‘aspects of things’. Both philosophers are committed to the view that 
object-perception is not a conceptual reconstruction of singular 
profiles and that the perceived object is given immediately and in the 
flesh (Leibhaftig) through these profiles. The object’s hidden profiles 
are neither known nor hypothesized : in largely compatible ways, 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty defend the view that these profiles form a 
protentional horizon of possible experiences and are given to the 
perceiving subject through the if-then structure of motor intentionality. 
If I move my body to the left, then new aspects of the house I 
perceive will be revealed. 
______________ 
30 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 355-356. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty”, p. 91. 
Corinne Lajoie 
 12 
While Kelly does speak of the subject’s ability to “take up [other] 
points of view”33 through a form of ‘bodily readiness’ near the end of 
his paper, this section does not clearly impinge on his conception of 
perceptual norms. Rather, Kelly maintains that our embodied 
perception of objects deviates from the optimal givenness of a ‘view 
from everywhere’. In my view, Kelly’s argument is misleading and 
suggests that perception’s embodied nature still limits our grip on the 
world in a problematic way, which calls for the hypothetical 
resolution of an all-encompassing omniscient view. My concern is 
that however much he stresses the importance of embodiment for 
Merleau-Ponty, Kelly still gives credit to the view that embodied 
perception in itself is constitutively insufficient to generate perceptual 
norms and to account for our responsiveness to them. This view is 
ultimately problematic from a phenomenological point of view, given 
the centrality of embodiment for our being in the world. All things 
considered, I worry that Kelly’s reading of normativity in Merleau-
Ponty is phenomenologically intenable and operates with virtual 
norms that lose their traction on lived experience.  
I believe that Kelly’s omission of the essential role played by 
interest and temporality is a good starting point to help explain some 
of the serious difficulties his text amounts to. On the one hand, it 
seems that norms are fundamentally contextual, and emerge out of 
our practical engagement with specific projects. On the other, Kelly 
offers no explicit description of the temporal emergence of norms 
and speaks of the ‘real colour’, the ‘real size’ or the ‘real object’ as a 
pre-determined and fixed exogenous norm standing outside the 
course of experience, thus leaving aside a fundamental aspect of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception. In what remains of this 
paper, I will attempt to briefly sketch out a merleau-pontian account 
of embodied perceptual norms by way of the threefold significance of 




33 Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty”, p. 100 
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3. Drawing out a new concept of norms 
3.1. Situated norms : the role of interest 
Although Merleau-Ponty also draws on the notion of practical 
interest in the Phenomenology of Perception, it should be noted that it was 
Edmund Husserl who first suggested a conception of optimality as 
relative to interest in §36 of the Thing & Space (1907) lectures, when 
he attempts to define the criteria of adequate perception. In Husserl’s 
theory of perception, the incomplete givenness of the perceived thing 
always “refers to possibilities of fulfillment whereby the thing would 
come, step by step, to full givenness.”34 In view of this aim of optimal 
givenness, our body continuously makes sense of and optimizes the 
intentional relations that stand between us and our experiential field. 
However, while Kelly’s argument suggests that the optimal 
perception against which my current perception is measured displays 
the richness and clarity of a ‘view from everywhere’, Husserl’s 
conception of “[the] circle of maximum givennesses”35 suggests 
otherwise36. Following Husserl’s example, when I see a match box 
nestled between books on a shelf, the slight variations that my 
perception of it might undergo do not matter the least, in this 
context, to optimally perceive the match box qua match box. As long 
as it allows me to perceive “the thing precisely as an ordinary thing in 
the sense of any common interest of practical life”37, a varying 
number of appearances, regardless of the distance from which I stand 
______________ 
34 Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907, trans. R. Rojcewicz 
(Dordrecht : Springer, 1997), p. 105. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Surprisingly, Kelly also quotes §36 of Thing & Space, but glosses over its 
central argument regarding the importance of interest for defining 
optimality. Instead, he quickly dismisses what he takes to be Husserl’s 
intellectualism and writes : “This system of perspectival presentations, which 
Husserl sometimes also calls the ‘circle of complete givenness,’ is the ‘real’ 
object to which each perspectival presentation refers but which none by 
itself is able to present. It can be understood intellectually, although not 
presented perceptually, by imagining yourself walking around the object or 
by imagining it rotating before you. This cannot be Merleau-Ponty’s view.” 
(Kelly, “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty”, p. 94-95) 
37 Husserl, E. Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907, p. 106. 
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or the lighting in the room, successfully fulfill my intention. However, 
Husserl adds : 
If the interest changes, if perhaps some intimation in the 
appearance that previously counted as complete gives the 
interest a new direction, then the circle of completely 
satisfying appearances is transformed into an unsatisfying 
circle, and the differences in the appearance, which 
previously were irrelevant, may possibly now become very 
relevant.38  
Husserl’s point is quite intuitive : since a perception is always the 
situated perception of a subject shaped by habits, goals, expectations 
and an experiential past, the optimal norm of perception simply 
cannot be a fixed one. In perception, “a practical tendency toward the 
optimum”39 moves us toward the satisfaction of these conditions, 
with “the interest [terminating] in the optimal givenness.”40 As 
Husserl would argue, the botanist’s interest in a flower is different 
from my own when I pass a flower shop on my way to university. My 
interest in getting to university in time for a class, the poor knowledge 
I have of plant biology, or my sudden desire to coordinate a bouquet 
of hydrangeas for a friend would all play constitutively different roles 
in establishing the norm for an adequately meaningful perception of 
the flowers. As Steven Crowell recently argued, the epistemic value of 
perception hinges on its claim to provide us “access to the object as 
something”41 and thus “it too must entail conditions of satisfaction 
that ‘set up’ (posit ; setzen) its object as a norm.”42 Husserl’s important 
claim, however, is that these conditions are constantly amenable to a 
variety of practical interests. 
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty offers his concept 
of ‘situation’ to make a similar claim and assert the importance of 
interests to account for normativity in perception. In distinguishing 
______________ 
38 Husserl, E. Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907, p. 106. 
39 Ibid., p. 321. 
40 Ibid., p. 322. 
41 Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger 
(Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 125. 
42 Ibid. 
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between a ‘spatiality of situation’ and ‘spatiality of position’43, 
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the essential role played by situatedness in 
embodied experience and argues that the spatiality of the embodied 
subject is largely defined by the intentional projects towards which 
she gathers herself. The situation of her body, then, is marked by a 
body “polarized by its tasks, insofar as it exists toward them, insofar 
as it coils up upon itself in order to reach its goal.”44 While her 
position determines the set of objective coordinates that a subject 
occupies in space, it does not give us the breath and scope of her 
intentional life, as it is defined by practical interests, bodily 
imperatives, skills and habits, affective moorings, and the likes. 
Through various forms of “bodily recognition”45, we attune ourselves 
to the “practical significations”46 opened up by our situation and take 
up their meaning into our own. This is what I take Merleau-Ponty to 
suggest when he writes of the living value of things (be it a body 
under a microscope, or the mat of a boat I glimpse in the distance), 
and of the perceptual equilibrium it calls on us to reach. 
Most importantly for the question that interests us, Merleau-
Ponty’s insistence on the notion of situation sheds new light on 
Kelly’s claim that “the view from everywhere, which is the optimal 
spatial context, is the view that would give me the maximum grip on 
the object (if I could have it).”47 Against Kelly, it seems that Merleau-
Ponty would hold that the maximal grip on the object is the type of 
grip on the world that allows me to walk down its streets, ride its 
trains, hold the hand of a friend, reach for a cigarette in my 
backpocket or distractedly skim through a book, as these situations all 
call forth different types of bodily responses. Perceptual norms, then, 
owe more to the subtle and dynamic coupling of our bodies with 
experiential cues in the world, than they do to the ideal standpoint of 
a view from everywhere. 
More generally, this central aspect of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s 
analysis holds great importance for the question of normativity 
because it emphasizes the broad and narrow contexts in which 
______________ 
43 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 102. 
44 Ibid., p. 103. 
45 Ibid., p. 81. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Kelly, “The Normative Nature of Perceptual Experience”, p. 95. 
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perception unfolds, and the role they play in defining the quality of 
our perceptions. Perceptual norms are not abstract optimas of 
givenness which stand outside of the various horizons in which they 
function. In what remains of this paper, I will show that these norms 
are rather determined both by the unfolding of short term intentional 
projects (i.e. selecting flowers for a bouquet, reaching for my 
toothbrush, finding a missing sock) and by the fine-grained 
experiential weight our body schemas carry through time, allowing for 
a stable and coherent experience. 
3.2. Emergent norms : the role of temporality 
In addition to being determined in part by the subject’s practical 
and situated interests, norms present specific temporal features which 
Kelly’s argument does not clearly address. To a certain extent, Kelly’s 
point that the optimal context of perception is determined by our 
positing of a virtual ‘view from everywhere’ begs the question. In 
holding that norms are exogenous standards against which our 
perceptions are measured, one is still confronted to the problem and 
how and why they come to be established. In Kelly’s view, norms are 
posited independently of our specific engagement with them and hold 
valid across different time scales. The house ‘seen from everywhere’ 
simply is what it is, independently of the constant ebbing and flowing 
of experience. Such a conception, however, is clearly incompatible 
with the conclusions I have drawn in the preceding section. 
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s work in The Structure of Behaviour, 
Maria Talero suggests we conceive of phenomenal settings as being 
fundamentally ‘mercurial’ and ‘labile’ environments characterized by 
their dynamic structure and emergent norms. In describing the 
particular setting of a football game, for example, she writes : “The 
‘workspace’ of football [...] is precisely this complex and intricate 
experiential arena characterized by ‘lines of force’, ‘sectors’ and 
‘zones’ that emerge as the play develops, which collectively function 
as normative parameters guiding each player’s participation the flow 
of play [...].”48 According to Talero, norms progressively emerge at 
the intersection of the player’s intentions and the affordances of the 
______________ 
48 Talero, “The Experiential Workspace and the Limits of Empirical 
Investigation”, p. 456. 
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experiential setting. They are “embedded in the very ‘flow’ of the 
play”49 and constantly “vulnerable to reinscription.”50 In such a view, 
perceptual norms are fundamentally permeable and are sensitive to 
past perceptions we retain, our experience of the present and our 
anticipation of the future unfolding of perceptual settings. 
This mercurial aspect of perceptual norms is also what I take to be 
David Morris’ point in his discussion of perceptual illusions, which 
functions just as well to acknowledge the basic structure of our 
everyday perceptions. Against a traditional conception of illusions as 
‘mistakes’, Morris suggests that the standards which allow us to 
conceive of some perceptions as illusions “[rely] on perspectives 
unavailable within illusory experience.”51 As Morris argues, the 
vocabulary of illusion is merely a retrospective characterization which 
testifies to the ambiguous overlapping between past and present 
perceptual norms. In the course of everyday perception, various 
timescales and the perceptual norms they carry come into play. 
Norms thus emerge both on the micro-timescale of experience (as 
classic ruber hand illusions tellingly reveal), and on the larger 
timescale of evolution, as “a past within living behavior.”52 They are 
both something “the organism brings along with it”53 and a 
normative complex “modulated, and instituted by presently ongoing 
dynamics”54.  
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty introduces the 
famous case of the Muller-Lyer illusion, in which two segments of 
equal lenght are respectively represented with inward-pointing and 
outward-pointing arrows. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, saying that I am 
perceiving the lenght of the segments in a right or a wrong way 
defeats the purpose of accounting for our perceptual engagement 
______________ 
49 Talero, “The Experiential Workspace and the Limits of Empirical 
Investigation”.  
50 Ibid. 
51 David Morris, “Illusions and Perceptual Norms as Spandrels of the 
Temporality of Living”, in Normativity in Perception, ed. Maxime Doyon 
and Thiemo Breyer (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 75-90, here 
p. 75. 
52 Ibid.  




with the illusion itself. The alternative, as Merleau-Ponty argues, 
belongs to a currently inoperable set of conceptual tools and thus 
requires that we introduce norms that are exogenous to our 
experience itself. Rather, the lines “are neither equal nor unequal”55 
and they stand in this compelling ambiguity until I actively attempt to 
resolve its tension. Of this ambiguity, Morris writes : “I have 
perceptual access to the Muller-Lyer figure only through my 
determinate body and habits, and that’s just the way it looks in virtue 
of my bodily-habitual engagement with it.”56 
The perceptual norms we operate with thus also heavily draw on 
an experiential past of embodied skills and habits which open up the 
world for us in differentiated and normatively attuned ways. Only 
when we recognize the essential temporality of embodied perceptual 
norms can we begin to understand how they emerge from a deep-
running engagement with the world rather than externally pre-
determine this encounter. Much like our experiences of the world are 
in contact with the horizons of past, present and future interactions, 
perceptual norms are established within “temporally thick”57 living 
dynamics. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I provided an analysis and criticism of Sean Kelly’s 
argument for normativity in perception, through the lense of 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. I rejected both Kelly’s 
insistance on the idea of an optimal all-encompassing view from 
everywhere, and the impossible standards it sets for everyday 
perception. Instead, I suggested that our perceptions are context-
sensitive and emerge in dynamic and labile environments through 
which our bodies attempt to find a proper equilibrium. To this end, I 
complicated Kelly’s claims by turning to the central role of (practical) 
interest and temporality at the most basic level of embodied 
experience. Although much remains to be said to establish a fully 
convincing account of perceptual norms, it should now be clear that 
______________ 
55 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 6.  
56 Morris, “Illusions and Perceptual Norms as Spandrels of the Temporality 
of Living”, p. 77. 
57 Ibid., p. 85. 
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my reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is 
incompatible with Kelly’s argument for perceptual presence and 
object constancy. While I agree with Kelly that perceptual norms play 
an essential part in shaping our interaction with the world, I contend 
that his view still lacks some key considerations to offer a convincing 
account of both their emergence and their signifiance. 
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